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ABSTRACT
Recent analyses suggest that cigarette excise taxes lower prenatal smoking. It is unclear,
however, whether the association between taxes and prenatal smoking represents a decline among
women of reproductive age or a particular response by pregnant women. We address this question
directly with an analysis of quit and relapse behavior during and after pregnancy. We find that the
price elasticity of prenatal quitting and postpartum relapse is close to one in absolute value. We
conclude that direct financial incentives to stop smoking during and after pregnancy should be
considered.
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I.  Introduction
Prenatal smoking is the most important modifiable risk factor for poor pregnancy outcomes in the
United States (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1990).  Approximately 20 percent of all
low birth weight births are attributable to smoking, and the risk of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS)
is three times greater for women who smoke (Institute of Medicine 1985; DiFranza and Lew 1995).  Nor
is the impact of maternal smoking limited to the perinatal period. The American Academy of Pediatrics
considers environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) a major risk factor for lower respiratory illness, middle ear
effusion and asthma in children (American Academy of Pediatrics 1977).
Maternal smoking has also become an important element of the debate over the optimal level of
cigarette excise taxes.  Unlike the public health community, economists tend to include only the external
costs of smoking—costs imposed on others—in  the calculation of optimal tax levels (Manning et al.
1991; Viscusi 1995).  Economists assume that parents account for or internalize the possible damage of
cigarettes to the fetus or infant when deciding to smoke.
1  The assumption has strong implications. Evans
et al. (1999), for instance, find that if considered external, the costs of maternal smoking adds between
42-72 cents per pack to the costs of smoking in 1994 dollars.  Since state and federal excise taxes
averaged 75 cents in 2000 (Orzechowski and Walker 2001), the consequences of maternal smoking alone,
if treated as external, would justify the present level of taxation.
Recent work by economists suggests that increases in the excise tax for cigarettes may be an
effective means of lowering the prevalence of smoking among pregnant women. In two papers (Evans
and Ringel 1999; Ringel & Evans 2000), authors use national natality files and report participation
elasticities of -0.5 and -0.7, which exceed the consensus estimate of aggregate elasticities of -0.3 to -0.5
(Chaloupka and Warner 2000). Another study that also uses national natality files reports a participation
elasticity of -.35 (Gruber and Köszegi 2001)  The obvious advantage of national natality data is the size of
the sample and its national coverage.
                                                
1 The obvious exception would be the medical and remedial costs of maternal smoking borne by taxpayers.2
However, these studies are limited to an analysis of smoking at a single, but unspecified point
during pregnancy.  Consequently, it is unclear whether the prevalence of smoking during pregnancy
associated with state excise taxes reflects the response to taxes by women of reproductive age, or a
particular response by pregnant women (Ebrahim et al. 2000).   The distinction has important implication
for policy.   If taxes have no effect on quit rates during pregnancy, but do lower the prevalence of
smoking among women of reproductive age, then efforts to lower smoking during pregnancy might best
be directed at smoking initiation among adolescent girls.  Pregnancy, on the other hand, may provide
important motivation for women to permanently quit.  As a result, policies directed specifically at
pregnant women may be more welfare enhancing than excise taxes directed at all smokers.
In this paper, we analyze the effect of cigarette excise taxes on smoking before, during and after
pregnancy.   With information on the prevalence of smoking at multiple points in time, we extend the
literature on maternal smoking and taxes with an analysis of prenatal quit and postpartum relapse rates.
We present a simple model that links quit rates to changes in smoking participation before and during
pregnancy.  The model provides guidance as to the presence of potential selection effects in conditional
analyses based on samples of pregnant smokers.   Moreover, our focus on quit probabilities provides
comparisons of the effectiveness of taxes as a smoking cessation intervention to clinical trials of prenatal
smoking cessation programs based on education and counseling. If taxes are associated with increased
quit rates during pregnancy, then taxes may provide an important complement to other smoking cessation
interventions as well as a source of funding.
Data are from the Pregnancy Risk Assessment Monitoring System (PRAMS): a random, stratified
monthly survey of recent mothers overseen by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
We combine data from 10 states over 7 years (1993-1999) and construct a sample of 115,000 women.
Although the number of states is limited, the detailed information on smoking and a richer set of
covariates makes PRAMS a significant source with which to analyze the effect of cigarette taxes on
maternal smoking.3
II.  Background
The U.S. Surgeon General’s 675-page report, Women and Smoking, details the distinctive
hazards faced by women who smoke.  “Although women and men who smoke share excess risks for
diseases such as cancer, heart disease, and emphysema, women also experience unique smoking related
disease risks related to pregnancy, oral contraceptive use, menstrual function and cervical cancer” (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Resources 2001, p. 5).   Despite the additional risks faced by women,
there is only a modest literature on differences in the price sensitivity of cigarettes by gender. Farrelly and
Bray (1998) use available panels from the National Health Interview Survey of individuals 18 years and
older between 1976-1993 and obtain an overall elasticity of -0.26 for men and -0.19 for women.
Participation elasticities are less: -0.18 and -0.09 for men and women, respectively.  Lewit and Coate
(1982) find participation elasticities between  -0.13 and -0.39 for women 20 to 35 years of age, neither of
which is statistically significant. The comparable elasticities for men range from -0.29 to -1.28.
Chaloupka and Pacula (1998) report smoking participation elasticities of -0.59 for women and -0.93 for
men.   All three studies use cross-state variation in prices to estimate elasticities.  Thus they assume that
the unmeasured factors that influence smoking in West Virginia are the same as in Maine.  This leaves the
studies vulnerable to significant omitted variable bias.  Nevertheless, a consistent finding is that women
are less sensitive to taxes than are men.
Studies of the effect of cigarettes taxes on prenatal smoking are quite recent.   Evans and Ringel
(1999) are the first to exploit the smoking indicator that was added to national natality files in 1989.  With
over 10 million births they estimate participation elasticities and conditional demand elasticities for
women who gave birth between 1989 and 1992.  They include a full set of state and month fixed effects
and thus rely on within-state-and-month variation to identify effects of taxation.   They find that a 10
percent increase in cigarette excise taxes lowers smoking participation by 5 percent, but has no effect of
the number of cigarettes smoked.  Their estimates are unaffected by adjustments for border crossing or
clean indoor air laws.  In a more recent version with this design, Ringel and Evans (2001) add three more
years of natality data in order to explore the heterogeneity of responsiveness to taxes by pregnant women.4
In this analysis they report a participation elasticity of –0.7, which the authors note is several times
greater than the participation elasticity for the general population.  Moreover, the absolute value of the
elasticity increases with socio-economic status.  Women who are married, older, and more educated have
elasticities that generally exceed one. As before, taxes have no effect on the number of cigarettes smoked
during pregnancy.
Evans and Ringel’s elasticities have important policy implications.  If pregnant women are more
sensitive to changes in prices than non-pregnant women, then other financial incentives in addition to
taxes could achieve significant declines.  For instance, health insurance premiums could be raised for
women who continue to smoke during pregnancy or bonuses awarded for women who quit.
However, other evidence suggests that Evans and Ringel’s estimates are optimistic.  Real
cigarette prices have risen 60 percent since 1997.  Given an elasticity of –0.7, we could expect a 42
percent drop in maternal smoking.   In fact, the proportion of women who smoke during pregnancy has
fallen from 13.2 in 1997 to 12.2 percent in 2000, a 7.6 percent decline.   Clearly, other factors besides
price affect prenatal smoking. Gruber and Köszegi  (2001) also use natality data and obtain an overall
elasticity of -0.35 , which implies an even lower participation elasticity.  Beside the extra year of data,
Gruber and Köszegi aggregate births into monthly cells, which may explain differences with Ringel and
Evans (2001).
The other surprising result obtained by Ringel and Evans (2001) is the positive relationship
between the absolute value of the elasticities and socio-economic status.  For instance, the elasticity of
participation is -3.39 for college educated pregnant women and -0.49 for women with a high school
degree.   Part of the discrepancy is attributable to the low prevalence of smoking among college-educated
women and its effect on the elasticity computation. However, even the marginal effects of taxes on
smoking (in absolute value) are greater for the highly educated.  This finding is counter to the result that
low-income smokers are more sensitive to the price of cigarettes than higher income smokers (Farrelly
and Bray 1998; Evans et al. 1999).5
The study by Gruber and Köszegi (2001) merits note because the authors find that pregnant
women are forward looking in their smoking behavior.   Excise taxes that have been enacted, but not yet
in effect reduce smoking among pregnant women.   The elasticity of cigarette consumption with respect
to prices is -0.15.
Another recent study uses longitudinal data from the National Maternal and Infant Health Survey
to examine the relationship between cigarette prices and maternal smoking (Bradford 2002).  Women
who gave birth in 1988 are surveyed again in 1991.  Since some women have had an additional child or
have become pregnant at the time of the 1991 interview, the author is able to analyze the effect of
pregnancy on smoking and the interaction of pregnancy and prices.  He finds that the price elasticity of
smoking is almost identical for both pregnant and recently pregnant women at about -0.30.  The most
significant limitation to this analysis is the lack of controls for national trends.  Real cigarette prices rose
between 1987 and 1991 while smoking prevalence declined.  In an earlier draft, the author acknowledged
that dummy variables for time wipe out the effect of price.  With approximately 6,000 women at four
points in time in the sample, there may be insufficient within-state variation in prices to identify price
effects.
In summary, the literature on the effect of cigarette taxes on smoking by women of reproductive
age is remarkably sparse.   There is consistent evidence that pregnant and non-pregnant women are
sensitive to cigarette prices and taxes.  Nevertheless, several important questions remain.  First, do
pregnant and non-pregnant women respond differently to taxes?  The relatively large elasticities obtained
by Evans and Ringel imply an interaction between pregnancy and taxes in a model of smoking
participation.  Ebrahim et al. (2000) question such interactions.  They show that the ratio of smoking
prevalence between pregnant to non-pregnant women is stable between 1987 and 1996, which they
interpret as a decline in ever-smoking among women of reproductive age.   We can address this question
more directly by analyzing the association between taxes and quit rates during pregnancy.   If the
elasticity of smoking participation before and during pregnancy is the same, then taxes will have no effect
on quit rates.6
We can also follow up on Gruber and Köszegi (2001) and offer some insight as to forward-
looking behavior among women who are about to become pregnant. PRAMS has information on whether
the pregnancy is intended or unintended.  We also know whether women who were ever smokers have
stopped smoking three months before pregnancy. Many women consider the risk to the fetus as the most
important reason to quit.  In addition, smoking lowers the probability of conception. Thus, we expect that
women who are trying to become pregnant are more likely to stop smoking in anticipation of these costs
than women whose pregnancies are unintended.
Finally, we can test whether taxes are associated with post-partum relapse rates. Approximately
40 percent of women quit smoking upon the realization that they are pregnant.  Such behavior
underscores the importance of fetal damage as a “cost” of smoking.    The fact that about approximately
75 percent of women who quit smoking during pregnancy relapse within one year of delivery suggests
that these costs are viewed as largely temporary, or at least greater than the costs of second hand smoke
on the newborn.  Consequently, taxes as a proportion of the total costs of smoking are probably greater in
the post-partum than the prenatal period and may have a greater impact on smoking.   The analysis of
taxes and post-partum relapse rates represents a novel contribution of this analysis.
III.  Analytical Framework
1. The reservation price of smoking
We develop a simple model to study cigarette consumption decisions made by women in each of
three periods surrounding pregnancy: the period before (b), the period during (d), and the period after (a).
In each period (p = b, d, a), her current period utility function (U) depends on the number of cigarettes
smoked (Cp) and another good (Xp) and is quadratic in these two goods:
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The parameters ax, axx, ac, acc, bb, bd, and ba are positive.  The variables Zb, Zd, and Za are dichotomous
indicators that equal one in the periods before, during, and after pregnancy, respectively.  Hence bdCd
represents the cost in utility terms imposed on her fetus by a pregnant woman who smokes during7
pregnancy and baca represents the cost in utility terms imposed on her child by a mother who smokes after
pregnancy. We assume bb < ba < bd.  This guarantees that some women will quit smoking during
pregnancy and also guarantees that not all quitters will restart.
Let Tp be the price of a pack of cigarettes, let m be the marginal utility of wealth, and let the
market rate of interest equal the rate of time preference for the present.  Then a woman will not smoke in
the period before pregnancy if the monetary value of the marginal utility of cigarettes evaluated at C = 0
[(ac/m) - bb/m)]—termed her ‘reservation price’—is smaller than or equal to Tb, and she will smoke if her
reservation price exceeds Tb.  In symbols
  Cb = 0 if (ac/m) - (bb/m) £ Tb
Cb > 0 if (ac/m) - (bb/m) > Tb.  (2)
During the pregnancy period (d), condition (2) becomes
Cd = 0 if (ac/m) - (bd/m) £ Td
Cd > 0 if (ac/m) - (bd/m) > Td. (3)
According to equation (3), with the money price of a pack of cigarettes held constant, a woman is less
likely to smoke when she is pregnant than when she is not pregnant because her reservation price—the
maximum price at which she is willing to become a consumer of cigarettes—falls from ac/m -bb/m to ac/m
- bd/m.
This simple framework generates demand functions for smoking participation and for the number
of cigarettes smoked conditional on positive consumption.  Price is expected to have a negative effect on
each outcome, and both should fall during the pregnancy period.  However, we are interested in the effect
of cigarette excise taxes on the decision to quit smoking during pregnancy and to restart after delivery.
The framework we have presented  highlights that, as a first approximation, the decision to stop smoking
or for that matter to stop consuming any good depends on changes in the reservation and money prices of
that good between two consecutive periods rather than on the absolute levels of these prices.  In
particular, a reduction in the reservation price of cigarette smoking between periods t and t+1 or an
increase in the money price of cigarettes between these two periods will cause some people to quit8
smoking.  The quit rate in period t+1 should, however, be zero if these two variables remain the same.
But we know from the clinical literature that between 30 to 40 percent of smokers quit when they become
pregnant (Quinn, Mullen, and Ershoff 1991).  This points to a decrease in the reservation price of
smoking caused by an increase in the health costs of this behavior  (bd/m exceeds bb/m in our notation),
since rarely is there a change in the price of cigarettes in the brief period from before pregnancy to the
realization of conception.  The question, therefore, is what role does the level of the price play, if any, in
the decision to quit smoking during pregnancy?   Put differently, why might high-tax states have higher
quit rates than low-tax states?
2. Relationship between smoking participation and quitting
The quit probability can be viewed as a conditional participation equation with implications for
the elasticity of smoking participation before and during pregnancy.  To illustrate, let P be the probability
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where Sd is the probability of smoking during pregnancy or the smoking participation rate during this
period at the aggregate level and Sb is the smoking participation rate in the period prior to pregnancy.
 2
The smoking participation rate in each period is negatively related to the “full price” of cigarettes in that
period.  The latter price is defined as
Fp (p = b, d) = Tp + (bp/m) = Tp + Mp, (6)
                                                
2 Let Nb be the number of smokers before pregnancy and let Nd be the number of smokers during pregnancy.  Assume nobody
starts smoking or resumes smoking after getting pregnant. Then Nd = Nb - Q, where Q is the number of women who quit.  Let N
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Rewrite this as  Sd = Sb(1 - Q) or Sd = SbP.9
where Mp is the monetary value of the utility or health cost of smoking in period p.  Note that from now
on, Mp is added to the money price rather than subtracted from the reservation price.
Suppose that Tb is equal to Td.  Differentiate equation (5) with respect to the common value T and
convert all terms to elasticities to obtain
r = hd - hb. (7)
According to equation (7), the elasticity of the probability of continuing to smoke during pregnancy with
respect to money price (r) is negative if the elasticity of smoking participation during pregnancy with
respect to money price (hd) is larger in absolute value than the elasticity of smoking participation with
respect to money price before becoming pregnant (hb).
3  The reverse holds if hb is larger than hd.   A zero
elasticity for the probability of smoking continuation implies that taxes have no differential effect on
pregnant women.  This would support the contention that the decline in smoking participation during
pregnancy reflects the general decline among women of reproductive age (Ebrahim et al. 2000).
Let ep be the elasticity of smoking participation with respect to the full price and let Kp be the
share of money price in full price.  Then
r = Kded - Kbeb. (8)
Clearly Kd is smaller than Kb since the health cost of smoking is greater in the period during pregnancy
than in the period before it.  Hence, if the full price elasticity were the same in each period, one obtains
the somewhat counterintuitive result that an increase in the money price of cigarettes raises the
probability of continuing to smoke during the pregnancy period or lowers the probability of quitting.  The
full price elasticity is unlikely, however, to be constant because this implies that the probability of
                                                                                                                                                            







Note that the elasticity of Q with respect to T (j) is given by10
smoking is specified as a log-linear function.  This specification does not take account of the distribution
of reservation prices and does not  constrain the participation probability to fall between zero and one.
Suppose that the reservation price has a uniform distribution with a minimum value of d and a
maximum value of g.  Then it is easy to show that the probability of smoking in period p is
Sp = (g - T - Mp)/(g - d), (9)
and the elasticity of Sp with respect to T is
hp = - T/(g - T - Mp). (10)
Clearly hd is larger in absolute value than hb since Md exceeds Mb.  From equation (7), the elasticity of
the probability of continuing to smoke during pregnancy with respect to T (r) is negative, and the
elasticity of the quit probability with respect to T is positive.
Now suppose that the reservation price has a normal distribution so that the probability of
smoking can be specified as a probit function.  This specification constraints Si to lie between zero and
one both theoretically and empirically. Let fp be the probit coefficient of money price in each period.
Then
r = T(fdld - fblb), (11)
where lp is the inverse of the Mills ratio.  Since lp is negatively related to the probability of smoking and
since women are less likely to smoke in the pregnancy period, ld exceeds lb.  Thus, r is negative if fd
equals fb and could be negative even if fd is smaller in absolute value than fb.  Moreover, given the
strong possibility of lagged as opposed to instantaneous adjustment, fd might well exceed fb.
3. Potential selection effects
A final consideration is that reservation prices before and during pregnancy are not observed and
must be replaced by their determinants.  One of these determinants is the unobserved propensity or taste
for smoking.  Denote this propensity by VQ and define it such that an increase in VQ causes an increase in
the quit probability.  Note that this disturbance term surely is negatively correlated with the disturbance
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term in the equation for smoking participation before pregnancy (VS*), where S* is a latent variable
governing the propensity to smoke before pregnancy, and an increase in VS* causes S* to rise.  In a
sample of women who smoked prior to pregnancy, a woman from a high price state is likely to have a
high value of VS*.  Hence Tb and VS* are positively correlated in the quit sample (and Tb and VQ are
negatively correlated) even if they are uncorrelated in the population at large.
The positive association between Tb and VS*  will bias downward the effect of taxes on quit rates.
However, we can obtain insight as to the importance of such selection effects by comparing estimates of
the price elasticity of quitting during pregnancy estimated directly to the same elasticity obtained from the
participation equations.  Specifically, we will estimate smoking participation equations before and during
pregnancy as a function of Tb.  Provided taxes are exogenous, we can back out an unbiased estimate of
the quit elasticity (see footnote 3).   We can compare this estimate to the one obtained directly by
regressing the probability of quitting during pregnancy on Tb.   If the estimate from the direct estimation
is substantially less than the estimate obtained from the unconditional participation equations, then we
would have evidence of selection effects.
 4
To summarize, we have outlined a framework in which the conditional probability of quitting
during pregnancy may be positively related to cigarette taxes.   If true, then we should find that the
elasticity of smoking participation during pregnancy exceeds in absolute value the elasticity of smoking
participation before pregnancy.  This would be consistent with recent work based on natality data in
which the elasticity of smoking participation during pregnancy appears substantially greater than the
elasticity of participation among women of reproductive age (Evans and Ringel 1999; Ringel and Evans
2001).   Two caveats exists.  First, changes in the non-monetary price of smoking associated with
childbearing can yield negative quit elasticities (equation 8).   Second, a larger proportion of women who
                                                
4 One way to account for the bias just outlined is to fit a bivariate probit model with sample selection (Wynand and van Praag
1981; Greene 2000).  We experimented with such models but identification proved difficult.  We used taxes at age 14 to predict
smoking participation just prior to pregnancy.  However, taxes at 14 had limited explanatory power.   One reason is that we did
not know the mother’s state of residence at  birth or more importantly, at age 14.   This form of measurement error would tend to
bias out estimates downwards.12
smoke just prior to pregnancy in high-tax states are likely to have a stronger preference for smoking than
their counterparts in low-tax states.  As a result, the elasticity of quitting with respect to the monetary may
be biased downwards in a sample of pregnant smokers.
IV.  Empirical Implementation
1.  Data
The Pregnancy Risk Assessment Monitoring System (PRAMS) is a random, stratified monthly
survey of recent mothers selected from birth certificates.   PRAMS was initiated by the Centers for
Disease Control in 1987 as a response to the slowdown in the rate of decline in infant mortality and the
absence of any decline in the rate of low birth weight births. PRAMS surveys are carried out by
participating states following explicit guidelines developed by the CDC. Each month the PRAMS staff in
each state selects between 100 and 250 recent mothers from birth certificates by stratified systematic
sampling with a random start.  Stratification variables, such as birth weight and race or ethnicity, vary
among states.  All states over-sample women at increased risk for adverse pregnancy outcomes.  Sampled
mothers are then sent a self-administered questionnaire two to six months after delivery; non-respondents
are followed up by telephone.  Response rates average between 70 and 80 percent after follow up. (See
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/drh/methodology.htm for more details.)
Twenty-five states participated in PRAMS in 2000 up from five states in 1988.  We use surveys
from 10 states that participated for at least 5 of the six years between 1993 and 1999: Alabama, Alaska,
Florida, Georgia (1993-1997), Maine, New York State (excluding New York City) Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Washington and West Virginia.  There are 115,000 observations, a total that, when weighted,
represents approximately 4,605,470 births, or 17 percent of deliveries in the U.S. over the same period.
The questionnaire in PRAMS asks women if they ever smoked at least 100 cigarettes in their
entire life.   Those that answer ‘yes’ are asked to record the number of cigarettes or packs of 20 cigarettes
they smoked per day, on average, in the three months before they were pregnant. They may also respond
by indicating that they smoked less than one cigarette per day, that they didn’t smoke at all, or that they13
do not know.   The same set of questions are asked about the period three months before delivery and at
the time of the survey, which occurs between 2 and 6 months after delivery.
We are primarily interested in the change in smoking behavior.
5 We create four dichotomous
indicators of change.  The first is one if the woman ever-smoked but did not smoke three months before
pregnancy (Quit_ever_before).    The second is one if the woman smoked three months before pregnancy
but not three months before delivery (Quit_before_during).  The third indicator is one if the woman
stopped during pregnancy, but resumed between 2 to 6 months postpartum (Resume).  And the final
indicator is one if the woman smoked before but not postpartum (Quit_before_after).   We refer to these
women as “permanent” quitters.  The importance of permanent quits is that women who stop smoking
during pregnancy, but resume postpartum, are still at double the risk for SIDS (Schoendorf and Kiley
1992).
 We do not analyze smoking intensity with PRAMS, but we do control for pre-pregnancy
cigarette consumption in the Quit_before_during ,  Resume, and Quit_before_after equations.
Consumption before pregnancy is a measure of the stock of smoking capital (Becker, Grossman and
Murphy 1994).  The clinical literature indicates that the lightest smokers prior to pregnancy are the most
likely to quit during and least likely to resume (Li et al. 1993; Quinn, Mullen, and Ershoff 1991;
Fingerhut, Kleinman and Kendrick 1990).  We create a trichotomous indicator of pre-pregnancy
consumption: less than 10 cigarettes per day, between 10 and 20 cigarettes per day and more than 20 per
day. We eliminated women who did not know how much they smoked before pregnancy (n=4325),
during pregnancy (n=2808) and after delivery (n=2381).
PRAMS also contains covariates in addition to those on birth certificates.  These include health
insurance status at delivery, family income, and pregnancy intention.  We use pregnancy intention to test
for forward-looking behavior.  Women are asked whether at the time that they first realized that they were
pregnant if they wanted to become pregnant then, or at some other time (mistimed) or not at all
(unwanted).  We characterize pregnancies that are mistimed or unwanted as unintended.   Smoking
                                                
5 We analyze smoking participation three months before delivery in order to compare PRAMS to published works.14
imposes two potential costs on women who want to have children.  First, smoking inhibits conception.
Second, and more well known, is the risk of adverse birth outcomes (U.S. Department of Health and
Human Resources 2001).  Thus, women who are trying to become pregnant may be more likely to quit in
the three months before pregnancy due to these anticipated costs, than women whose pregnancies are
unintended.
2. Reported Smoking
A limitation of self-reported smoking is the potential for underreporting.  Clinical studies or
prenatal smoking that use biological markers to estimate exposure find that a little as 10 and as much as
30 percent of prenatal smoking is not reported by the women.  Birth certificates capture less smoking than
hospital medical charts (Piper et al. 1993; Buescher et al. 1993) and the prevalence of smoking as
reported in PRAMS exceeds that reported on birth certificates. The latter is likely an underestimate of the
true difference between birth certificates and PRAMS since birth certificates ask about smoking at any
time during pregnancy and PRAMS specifically asks about smoking in the three months before delivery.
If smoking were equally well reported on PRAMS and birth certificates, the percentage of women
reporting smoking anytime during pregnancy should exceed the percentage reporting smoking during the
last trimester, since the latter group is a subset of the former.  For example, in the National Household
Survey on Drug Abuse, 20 percent of women reported smoking at any time during pregnancy, but only 16
percent reported smoking during the last trimester.
Figure 1 compares smoking during pregnancy from three sources: the Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance System (BRFSS), PRAMS and birth certificates.
6   Women in the BRFSS are asked about
smoking and later asked whether they are pregnant at this time.  If we accept that there are few false
positives, then PRAMS is superior to birth certificates and the BRFSS as a screen for smoking.  Smoking
in the last three months of pregnancy is between 1 and 2 percentage points higher than what is recorded
                                                
6 The BRFSS is a monthly telephone survey of adult health practices and behaviors by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention and State health departments.  Initiated in the early 1980’s, the BRFSS interviews approximately 125 adults per
month in each state (Remington et al. 1988).  Fifty states now participate.  We use data from 1987 to 2000.   There are 33 states
in 1987, a number which rises to 50 by 1993.   We limit the sample to women 18 to 44 years of age.15
for smoking during pregnancy on birth certificates.  Also noteworthy is that the prevalence of smoking
based on birth certificates is similar in nine of the 10 PRAMS states to all available states.
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3. Econometric model
We use probits to estimate smoking participation and quit models.  The basic specification is as
follows:
  ￿ + + + + F = =
k
ijt t j kijt k ijt e T X S ob ), ( ) 1 ( Pr t t f s
where Sijt is one if woman i, in state j, and year t smokes.  Let Xkijt be maternal characteristics, T is the
level of state and federal taxes in 1982-84 dollars, tj  and tt are state and year fixed effects respectively,
and eijt is the residual. All analyses are weighted with the survey weights and we use robust procedures
for the standard errors that cluster on state and year.
V.   Results
1. Smoking participation
We first use PRAMS to analyze the effect of state cigarette excise taxes on smoking participation
before, during and after pregnancy. Results are shown in Table 1.  For each outcome in, we present
separate regressions for a contemporaneous tax and taxes lagged approximately nine months.
8  Estimates
should be interpreted as the marginal change in probability of each outcome given a one cent change in
the real tax.   We also present price elasticities for each outcome under the assumption that a one cent
increase in taxes causes a commensurate increase in price (Evans et al. 1999).
Taxes are negatively related to smoking before, during and after pregnancy.  Of the six estimates,
five have t-ratios greater than one, although only two are statistically significant at conventional levels
(p<.05).  Implied price elasticities range from -0.23 to -0.91.
9  The largest elasticity pertains to taxes three
months before pregnancy on smoking participation three months before delivery.  For two of the three
                                                
7 New York, one of the 10 PRAMS states, did not report smoking on the birth certificate.
8 The decision to lag nine approximately nine months exploits the space between reporting period.  Thus, women are asked about
smoking three months before delivery as well as three months before pregnancy, a spacing of nine months.   Similarly,  women
are asked between 2 and 6 months postpartum, upwards of nine months after they were asked about smoking before delivery.16
outcomes, the lagged exceed the contemporaneous estimate.   The weakest association is the relationship
between taxes three months before delivery and smoking participation also three months before delivery
(column 3).  This is not surprising given that the vast majority of women quit early in pregnancy
(Fingerhut, Kleinman and Kendrick 1990).  Women who smoke in the last trimester are likely to have the
strongest preference for smoking and thus, the least sensitive to changes in monetary prices.
2. Quit and relapse behavior
As we argued above, pregnancy causes a large decrease in the reservation price of smoking due to
the risks it poses for the fetus. Thus, even if taxes and prices remained unchanged, we expect between 30
and 40 percent of women who smoke prior to pregnancy to quit during pregnancy.  The question we
address in this section is whether states with high taxes have higher quit rates and lower relapse rates than
states with lower taxes.
Figures 2 through 5 display four outcomes related to changes in smoking behavior around the
time of birth.  In each Figure, we show separate series for New York and Washington, Alaska and Maine
and the other six states in PRAMS.  The grouping is based on changes in state excise taxes.  New York
and Washington raised taxes between 1993 and 1995; Alaska and Maine raised taxes one month apart in
1997.    The other six states did not increase state excise taxes over this time period.
10
There is no apparent association between state excise taxes and quit rates three months before
pregnancy among ever smokers (Figure 2).   Quit rates during pregnancy rise sharply after 1994 in New
York and Washington and are relatively flat in the other states between 1993 and 1996 (Figure 3); and
although there is an increase in quit rates in Alaska and Maine after 1996, it is difficult to distinguish the
rise from the upward trend in quit rates in the non-tax-changing states (Figure 3).  There is no obvious
association between the rate of postpartum relapse and the timing of the state tax changes.   Nevertheless,
relapse rates are similar in 1993 among all states but noticeably less among the tax-changing states in
1999 (Figure 4).   Finally, permanent quit rates defined as the percent of women who smoked before
                                                                                                                                                            
9 We assume that a one cent increase in taxes increase price by the same amount.
10 Federal tax increases bracket our study period.  The federal excise tax increased from 20 to 24 cents in January, 1993 and from
24 to 32 cents in January, 2000.17
pregnancy but who do not smoke postpartum jumped sharply in New York and Washington after 1995
(Figure 5).  In short, there is some visual evidence that smoking behavior changed in the wake of state
excise tax increases, but the strength of the association is not apparent.  We turn, therefore, to the
regressions of quit behavior.
Table 2 shows the means for the covariates that we use in the quit regressions stratified by year
and tax-changing states.   A salient feature is that the intensity of smoking prior to pregnancy in the two
groups of states is similar in 1993.   Approximately 20 percent of pregnant smokers in tax-changing and
non-tax-changing states smoke less than 11 cigarettes (light smokers) and 16 percent smoked more than a
pack per day (heavy smokers) in 1993.  By 1999 there are more light smokers and fewer heavy smokers
in the tax-changing states relative to the non-tax-changing states.   There is also a noticeable shift in the
age distribution of pre-pregnancy smokers.  The proportion of teens among pre-pregnant smokers
increases from 12 to 18 percent between 1993 and 1999 in the tax-changing states and from 16 to 19
percent in the non-tax-changing states.  The shift in age may explain in part the relative increase in light
smoking.   We turn therefore, to the multivariate estimates in order to adjust for the changing
characteristics of pre-pregnant smokers in the quit models.
The probit regressions pertain to the four quit probabilities shown in Figures 2 through 5. We
associate taxes at the beginning of each quit period with quitting behavior.   Thus, we use taxes at age 14
in the equation of ever smokers who no longer smoke three months prior to conception
(Quit_ever_before); similarly, we use taxes three months before conception in the quit equations during
pregnancy (Quit_before_during) and permanent quits (Quit_before_after) and taxes three months before
delivery in the relapse models. Results are displayed in Table 3.  Taxes at age 14 are strongly and
positively correlated with quitting prior to pregnancy.   The elasticity is 0.66 (column 1). Taxes before
pregnancy significantly increase the likelihood that a woman will quit before delivery (column 2). The
implied price elasticity is 1.04. Taxes are also associated with a lower probability that a woman will
resume smoking between 2 to 6 months postpartum, although the estimate is not is not statistically
significant (column 3).  The last estimate associates taxes with what we call “permanent” quits: women18
who smoked before pregnancy but not after.   Permanent quits include women who smoked during
pregnancy and stopped postpartum, although this represents only 10 percent of “permanent” quitters.
The responsiveness of prenatal smokers to taxes is large enough to account for a substantial
portion of the rise in quit rates in recent years.  From 1993 to 1999 among PRAMS states, the quit rate
during pregnancy rose from 37.3 to 46.4 percent and the weighted average tax rose from  $0.33 to $0.40.
The coefficient on tax in column 2 implies that quit rates would have risen by approximately 2.5
percentage points due to taxes alone, or over a quarter of the actual change.
11   We obtain a similar result
based on the change in prices. For instance, prices rose from $1.33 to $1.41 (6.1%) in real 1982-84$ from
1993 to 1999 in our PRAMS states.  Given a price elasticity of 1.04, we would expect the quit rate to rise
to 39.6%, which again is approximately a quarter of the observed change in quits.
12
As we argued above, the quit elasticity obtained from the sample of pre-conception smokers may
be biased downwards since women in high-tax states that smoke may have a greater taste for smoking.
To obtain insight as to possible selection effects, we use estimates from the participation equations in
Table 1 to back out the implied quit elasticity.
13  From this exercise we obtain a quit elasticity of 0.84,
which is less than the estimated elasticity, but reasonably close.
We also display the marginal effects of selected covariates in Table 3.   As noted above, women
who intend to become pregnant are much more likely to quit smoking prior to pregnancy, than women
whose pregnancies are unintended.  Once conception is known, however, there is no difference in
smoking behavior by pregnancy intention.  We interpret this finding as support for the importance of
future “prices” on current behavior.  Another notable finding is the robust impact of first births on quit
behavior.  Although women delivering their first child are 7 percentage points less likely to quit prior to
pregnancy, once pregnant their smoking behavior changes much more than women of higher order births.
Specifically, women having a first birth are 14 percentage points more likely to quit during pregnancy, 10
                                                
11 2.5 = .0035*($0.40-$0.33).
12 The price changes might appear modest.  However, we use the price three months before pregnancy.  Thus, many of the
pregnancies in our 1999 sample were unaffected by the large price increases that followed the tobacco settlement in November of
1998.  In fact, if we use the price three months before delivery, the change in 1982-84 dollars between 1993 and 1999 in our 10
PRAMS states is from $1.23 to $1.71 or 39 percent.19
percentage points less likely to resume after delivery and 10 percentage points more likely to quit
permanently relative to women who deliver a higher order birth.  As a percentage of the mean of each quit
behavior, these effects are very large.  One speculation is that women use previous birthing experience to
adjust the expected costs of smoking.  Even for women who smoke, the probability of a low birth weight
birth is only about 0.12, or double of those that don’t.   Thus, the high probability of a good birth outcome
despite smoking may lead women to discount the risk of prenatal smoking.  One way to test this would be
to include a measure of previous adverse birth outcomes.  We lacked such data in PRAMS.  However, in
a study of consecutive births in Georgia, researchers found that women who smoked during their first
pregnancy were less likely to smoke in the second, if the first infant had died.  Interestingly, a first birth
of low birth weight had no effect on smoking during the second pregnancy (Dietz et al. 1997).
The other noteworthy result pertains to prior smoking behavior among those who quit.  As shown
in Table 4, light smokers, those that smoke less than a half a pack a day, are much more likely to quit than
heavier smokers. In our sample, for instance, 71 percent of light smokers, 36 percent of moderate smokers
and 22 percent of heavy smokers quit during pregnancy.
3.  Sensitivity analysis
One concern is that our results are sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of a particular state,
since we have only 4 states in which tax changes were enacted (Alaska, Maine, New York and
Washington).  In Table 4 we present additional estimates of the marginal effect of taxes on the probability
of quitting during pregnancy. We focus on quits from before to during pregnancy given the health
consequences of quitting and the robustness of our initial findings.  Each row is from a separate
regression in which we have altered the specification or the sample.  Row 1 repeats the estimate from
Table 3 for convenience.  The specification in row 2 includes no covariates other than state and year fixed
effects.  In rows 3 through 6 we drop one of the tax-changing states and in rows 7 through 10 we include
only one of the tax-changing states.  Except for when we include New York (row 9), marginal effects
range from .0020 to .0042 and are statistically significant in 7 of the 8 cases. In the last row we include
                                                                                                                                                            
13 Using the formula in footnote 8 and estimates from Table 1, the implied quit elasticity equals [-0.30- (-0.91)]*(.58/.42)= 0.84.20
only the tax-changing states.  In this specification we rely on the variation in the timing of the tax
increases to provide the relevant “comparison” state. The marginal effect falls by almost half when we
include only the four tax-changing states.  Nevertheless, changes in taxes still explain almost a quarter of
the increase in quits over the study period.
14
The next set of analyses explores the heterogeneity of taxes on quit probabilities by parity,
maternal schooling and pre-pregnancy smoking.  We consider only binary stratification because of sample
size limitations.  Estimates are shown in Table 5.  Although none of the differences in marginal effects
within each category is statistically significant, we find that the marginal effect of taxes on quit
probabilities are greater among women with first births, less education and more pre-conception smoking.
VI.  Conclusion
In this paper we examine whether increasing cigarette taxes is an effective way to reduce
smoking among pregnant women.  One justification for raising taxes would be that they influence
pregnant women more, and thus change behavior most where the externalities are greatest. We find strong
support for the use of taxes in our quit equations.  We estimate that a 10 percent increase in cigarette taxes
would increase the probability of a woman quitting by 10 percent, a result that holds up in separate
regressions stratified by education, parity, and pre-pregnancy smoking and with various combinations of
states.  Since higher costs of smoking appear to be quite effective in inducing women to quit smoking
during pregnancy, direct financial incentives to stop smoking during and after pregnancy should be
considered.
We also find that women who smoke during pregnancy are not a random cross-section of
reproductive-age smokers.  In particular, more women who intend to become pregnant quit prior to
pregnancy than women whose pregnancy was unintended.  We also find that women delivering their first
child are much more likely to quit during pregnancy and less likely to resume postpartum than women
                                                
14 The weighted average of real state taxes rose by 15.5 cents between 1993 and 1999 in Alaska, Maine, New York and
Washington.  The percent of women who  quit smoking during pregnancy increased by 13.0 percentage points, from 34.3 in 199321
with previous live births.  Perhaps cessation policies aimed specifically at first-time mothers would
persuade more women to quit than a general program aimed at all pregnant women.
One concern is that quit and relapse elasticities based on a sample of pregnant women who smoke
are biased since smokers in high-tax states would have a stronger preference for cigarettes than women in
low-tax states.   Using the relationship between quit and participation elasticities, we show that the
elasticity of quitting during pregnancy estimated directly is close to the quit elasticity that we obtain with
the difference in participation elasticities before and during pregnancy.  We interpret this result as some
evidence that the conditional estimates based on a sample of smokers are not obviously contaminated by
pre-pregnancy attrition in high-tax states.
Maine, Washington and New York have increased cigarette excise taxes by a simple average of
30.5 cents in constant dollars since 1999.   Based on our estimates, quit rates should increase 5.8
percentage points in these states.
15  If realized, these changes compare favorably to the change in quit
rates achieved by prenatal smoking cessation programs.  A  meta-analysis of prenatal smoking
interventions found that quit probabilities were approximately 6.6 percentage points greater for those in
treatment relative to control groups (Dolan-Mullen, Ramirez and Groff 1994).   The recent tax increases
in New York and Washington are large and probably unrepresentative of future tax increases in most
other states.  Nevertheless, they underscore the potential of increasing the monetary costs of smoking
during pregnancy to affect quit rates.
Taxes appear to be nearly as effective in reducing relapse rates as in encouraging quitting.  We
find that a 10 percent rise in taxes reduces the likelihood of resuming smoking by 10 percent. However,
despite the increased taxes of recent years, half of all quitters resume smoking within six months of
delivery and 75 percent resume within a year, suggesting that their reservation prices tend to return to pre-
pregnancy levels.  One interpretation is that new mothers do not perceive postpartum smoking to be as
harmful as prenatal smoking despite recent research on the relationship between smoking and SIDS,
                                                                                                                                                            
to 47.3 in 1999. Thus, .0019*15.5 = 0.029 which is 22 percent of the change. We obtain a similar result if we use the quit
elasticity of 0.67 and a real price change of 14 percent.
15 Use the marginal effect for the tax-changing states, .0019 from Table 4, and multiply by 30.5.22
asthma and lower respiratory infections.  This suggests that doctors and public agencies need to better
advertise the dangers of postpartum smoking.23
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Real tax, 9 months before conception -0.00070
(1.57)




Real tax at interview date -0.00111*
(2.32)
Observations 96895 96895 100960 98153 95886 101259
Elasticity -0.30 -0.34 -0.23 -0.91 -0.36 -0.69
Mean of the dependent variable 0.26 0.26 0.15 .15 0.22 0.22
The participation models were estimated as probits.  Values are marginal effects with robust z-statistics in parentheses.  All models include
indicator variables for family income (5), health insurance (4) maternal education (5), age (2), race (2), marital status (1), parity (1), pregnancy
intention (1) as well as state and year fixed effects.  All models but column 6 also include indicator variables (5) for income. The ten PRAMS
states are AL, AK, FL, GA (1993-97), ME, NY, OK, SC, WA and WV.  All models are weighted by survey weights and standard errors have been
adjusted for clustering by state and year.   The sample based on birth certificates does not include NY.   * significant at 5%27
Table 2. Mean Characteristics of Women who Smoked Three Months before Pregnancy by
Year (1993 and 1999) and Tax-Changing versus Non-Tax-Changing State:
Tax-Changing States:
AK, ME, NY, WA
Non-Tax-Changing States:









Quit during pregnancy 0.344 0.473 0.388 0.458
Family income (000’s 1982-84 $)
<10 0.374 0.381 0.460 0.334
11-20 0.240 0.225 0.171 0.295
20-30 0.287 0.331 0.131 0.082
31-40 0.008 0.006 0.039 0.051
41-50 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002
>50 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
Unknown 0.090 0.057 0.196 0.233
Mother’s education
0-8 years 0.042 0.028 0.044 0.029
9-11 years 0.162 0.193 0.269 0.248
12 years 0.465 0.420 0.415 0.392
13-15 years 0.219 0.214 0.183 0.231
‡16 years 0.074 0.090 0.079 0.089
Unknown 0.038 0.055 0.010 0.012
Mother’s age
<20 0.117 0.178 0.156 0.192
20-29 0.669 0.511 0.577 0.585
‡30 0.213 0.312 0.267 0.223
Insurance coverage
Medicaid 0.502 0.438 0.569 0.539
Other public 0.046 0.016 0.021 0.020
Private 0.372 0.467 0.316 0.380
Uninsured 0.077 0.076 0.081 0.054
Insurance unknown 0.003 0.004 0.013 0.008
First birth (yes=1) 0.435 0.456 0.430 0.436
Maternal race
White 0.887 0.874 0.873 0.869
Black 0.071 0.061 0.111 0.094
Other 0.042 0.064 0.016 0.037
Married (yes=1) 0.493 0.500 0.622 0.569
Pregnancy unintended (yes=1) 0.501 0.512 0.501 0.516
Pre-pregnancy smoking
<11 0.207 0.282 0.195 0.25028
11-20 0.632 0.626 0.635 0.621
>20 0.161 0.092 0.170 0.129
Real tax $ (1982-84) 40.375 55.452 29.135 28.53229
Table 3: Changes in Quit Probabilities  Before, During and After Pregnancy,
10 PRAMS States, 1993-1999
Quit_ever_before Quit_before_during Resume Quit_before_after
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Taxes at various points in time
   Real tax at age 14 0.0016
(2.42)**
   Real tax 3 months pre-conception 0.0035 0.0026
(3.13)** (2.96)**
   Real tax at interview date -0.0038**
(2.78)
Selected covariates
   Unintended pregnancy -0.065 0.006 -0.009 0.005
(4.92)** (0.34) (0.44) (0.39)
    First birth -0.071 0.144 -0.106 0.101
(7.13)** (9.12)** (6.45)** (8.47)**
    10-20 cigarettes/day pre-pregnancy -0.347 0.099 -0.201
(21.65)** (4.13)** (10.60)**
    21 + cigarettes/day pre-pregnancy -0.384 -0.003 -0.165
(22.39)** (0.09) (17.84)**
Elasticity 0.66 1.04 -1.00 1.46
Mean of dependant variable 0.30 0.42  0.51 0.23
Observations 38099 27514 10927 27550
All models were estimated as probits.  Figures are d(Prob Quit=1)/dtaxesi. T-ratios are in parentheses. Models include indicator variables for
family income (5),  health insurance (4), education (5), age (2), race (2), marital status (1), plus state and year fixed effects.  Resume models
also include the time in days between delivery and the postpartum interview.   All models are weighted by survey weights and standard errors
have been adjusted for clustering by state and year.30
Table 4. Cigarette Taxes Three Months before Delivery and Probability of Quitting Smoking during Pregnancy:
Sensitivity to Specification and Sample of PRAMS States
Marginal effect t-ratio Price elasticity
1.  Full sample (from Table 3) .0035 3.13 1.04
2.  Only state and year fixed effects .0028 2.64 0.84
3.  Full sample less Alaska .0042 2.94 1.26
4.  Full sample less Maine .0037 3.04 1.10
5.  Full sample less New York .0032 3.05 0.90
6.  Full sample less Washington .0039 2.30 1.14
7.  Only Alaska and non-tax changing states .0020 2.92 0.55
8.  Only Maine and non-tax changing states .0023 0.94 0.63
9.  Only New York and non-tax changing states .0110 4.48 3.44
10. Only Washington and non-tax changing states .0041 2.74 1.17
11. Only AK, ME, NY and WA .0019 1.70 0.67
All models were estimated as probits.  Marginal effects are the d(Quit=1)/dTaxI.  Except for row 2, all models include indicator
variables for parity (1), pregnancy intentions (1), and pre-pregnancy smoking (2), family income (5),  health insurance (4), education
(5), age (2), race (2), marital status (1), plus state and year fixed effects. All models are weighted by survey weights and standard
errors have been adjusted for clustering by state and year31
Table 5. Cigarette Taxes and Probability of Quitting Smoking during Pregnancy:
By Parity, Maternal School and Pre-pregnancy Smoking, 10 PRAMS States 1993-1999
Parity Maternal Schooling Pre-Pregnancy Smoking
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Elasticity 1.03 1.02 1.29 0.49 0.50 1.22
Mean Dep var 0.53 0.35 0.38 0.54 0.72 0.34
Observations 12465 15049 19813 7198 6385 21129
All models were estimated as probits.  Figures are dQ/dXi. T-ratios are in parentheses. Models include indicator variables for family
income (5),  health insurance (4), education (5), age (2), race (2), marital status (1), parity (1), pregnancy intentions (1), pregnancy
smoking (2) and state and year fixed effects. All models are weighted by survey weights and standard errors have been adjusted for
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